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This article provides an analysis of institutional biases - in other words, ‘parallax fallacies’ - in the 
European Commission’s risk management system. Building on sociological understandings of risk and 
the recent EU timescape approach in EU studies, we identify six potential fallacies: 1) a misrepresen-
tation or underestimation of risk, 2) an unrepresentative estimation of risks, 3) normatively contestable 
estimations of risk, 4) an institutionally or functionally limited view on risk, 5) a blurred focus on the 
political aspect of the risk due to risk transformation, 6) a time-lagged risk assessment. These fallacies 
are evaluated with regard to the 2° Celsius target of the Commission’s climate change policy. 
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Cet article offre une analyse des biais institutionnels – autrement nommés parallax fal-
lacies – dans le système de gestion du risque de la Commission européenne. S'inspirant à 
la fois des approches sociologiques du risque et des récentes analyses politologiques de 
l'UE prenant en compte le facteur temps (EU timescape), le texte identifie six biais : 1) 
une fausse représentation ou une sous-estimation du risque, 2) une représentation du 
risque non représentative, 3) des estimations du risque contestables normativement, 4) 
une estimation du risque limitée fonctionnellement ou institutionnellement, 5) un focus 
inexact sur l’aspect politique du risque dû à la transformation de celui-ci, 6) une évalua-
tion du risque plombée par le décalage chronologique nécessaire à l'élaboration de la 
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norme. Ces problèmes sont évalués ici dans le cas de l'objectif 2° Celsius de la politique 
de changement climatique de la Commission européenne. 
Introduction 
This article focuses on the European Commission because it is at the centre stage of 
the development of the European Union’s (EU) policy development. For students of 
EU politics, policies, and polity, the Commission represents an increasingly better un-
derstood yet under-researched fascinating unit of analysis. The Commission has the 
right of legislative initiative and can therefore set a path-dependent process in motion. 
Interestingly enough, large parts of a Commission proposal for a directive remain un-
changed when debated and adopted via the community method (Hull 1993 : 83). Often, 
the general legislative framework remains untouched in the interinstitutional bargaining, 
whereas details are bargained about. At the same time, the adoption of a proposal is 
very likely once the proposal for a directive has left the Commission (Mahoney 2008: 
25). Additionally, the Commission is the “guardian of the ‘European clock’ “ which en-
sures legislative consistency over time and facilitates the decision-making process 
(Tholoniat 2009 : 221f.). 
The focus on climate change has been chosen because it, firstly, constitutes one of 
the most pressing policy problems the EU has faced during the Barroso Presidency of 
the European Commission. The EU has adopted an array of measures, the latest in De-
cember 2008 with the so-called climate package, including the revision of the Emissions 
Trading Scheme Directive, as well as, amongst others, directives on renewable energy, 
biofuels, and carbon capture storage. Shortly after the end of the first term of José 
Manuel Barroso, the EU will engage with its international counterparts to negotiate a 
follow-up agreement for the Kyoto Protocol. Secondly, climate change is a prime ex-
ample of risk management. The climate policy of the EU rests on the assumption that 
controlling the increase of global temperature by maximally 2° Celsius would represent 
acceptable risks with regard to the consequences of climate change. 
In accordance with the objective of this edition to provide academic cutting-edge re-
search informed by the practical insights gained by its authors, this paper aims at shed-
ding some light into the institutional biases which can be traced down in the Commis-
sion’s policy management emerging from the 2° Celsius assumption. The different 
biases can be compared with the ‘conceptual parallax’ which can be found in research 
designs. The term parallax originates from photography and describes  
“an apparent displacement of an object due to an observer’s position” where a “rela-
tively slight and apparently inconsequential difference in viewpoint … can, over time 
and distance, displace the perception of the object of attention. … The photographer 
may have to make adjustments in focus to compensate for parallax. Failure to do so 
may result in a photograph that misses or partially cuts off the intended object of the 
photograph.” (Caldwell 1996: 402)  
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Caldwell calls this assumed certainty, which leads to biased conclusions; the ‘parallax 
fallacy’ (Caldwell 1996: 402). He believes that this fallacy leads to errors of conceptuali-
zation of a problem or method of investigating the problem (Caldwell 1996: 405). This 
paper would like to take the ‘parallax fallacy’ further when it argues that the manage-
ment of risk, time and knowledge can lead to a biased policy. The Commission ac-
counts for some of these parallax fallacies, and for some of these only partly. 
Concretely, there are four implications of the risk management in the case of the 2° 
Celsius target which bear considerable implications: Firstly, the target has been set on 
the basis of expert knowledge. Secondly, the target represents a risk calculation. Thirdly, 
the target represents a decision made at a particular time. With regard to all three as-
pects of the 2° Celsius assumption, the Commission is, fourthly, caught in its transves-
tite nature of being a problem-solving yet political institution. Between ‘puzzling’ and 
‘powering’ (Hugh 1974: 305f.), the Commission attempts to merge two dynamics which 
at times lead to a trade-off: A perfect solution of a problem might not be politically ac-
ceptable whereas a politically acceptable solution might not solve the problem (com-
pletely).  
In the case of the EU’s climate policy, the 2° Celsius target is politically accepted, but 
expert contestation mounts. The judgement call about the 2° Celsius target will be 
made later in history. Nevertheless, this paper would like to take the climate policy as a 
case in point to shed light into inbuilt institutional biases of the Commission, which in-
fluence policy choices based on risk and knowledge management. Insofar, this paper 
aims at informing the academic debate about knowledge and policy learning from an 
institutionalist point of view. At the same time, it aims at improving the understanding 
of the practitioner in EU policy making about inbuilt tendencies of decision-making. 
The paper’s analysis is structured along the following lines: Firstly, sociological ap-
proaches and the recent turn to time in EU politics analysis will be taken as a starting 
point to develop potential accounts of institutional pitfalls to risk management in the 
Commission. Secondly, the Commission’s efforts to tackle these biases are introduced 
and put into context. Thirdly, the 2° Celsius target will be taken as an illustration of the 
practical implications of the institutional biases. A conclusion will summarise the paper 
and point at further avenues for researchers who would like to continue research on 
risk management in the Commission.  
 
2.1. Five institutional parallax fallacies derived from 
sociological approaches to risk  
Climate change is a risk with a multitude of dimensions. Such a risk represents a sig-
nificant challenge for policy makers. In the following, sociological understandings of 
risk shall be employed to exemplify the challenges the Commission faces in managing 
risks – and especially modern risks such as climate change. Before doing so, a short re-
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view of the different understandings of ‘risk’ in systems theory, risk society, and gov-
ernmentality approaches is necessary. 
‘Risk’ as a term is said to derive from the Latin term risco, a navigational term for 
sailors, which was used as “a synonym for danger or peril, for some unhappy event 
which may happen to someone” (Ewald 1991: 199). ‘Risk’ as a concept, however, has 
been defined very differently by varying approaches. Sociological approaches to risk 
have often conceptualized it as opposed to uncertainty. The governmentality literature 
understands risks as “statistical predictions of the future” as opposed to uncertainty 
which would derive its expectations of the future in non-probabilistic ways (O’Malley 
2008: 72). Beck shares this understanding with the governmentality literature, but for 
the latter, risk is a governance technique, whereas risk for Beck has a much broader 
meaning: he attributes the production of risk to the production of wealth in modernity. 
Beck’s risk society uses risk as a major analytical device for understanding modernity. 
Luhmann (1993: 19ff) rejects the opposite pair of risk and safety on the grounds that 
both of them are subject to differing degrees of uncertainty and suggests using the dis-
tinction between risk and danger. Risk thereby becomes a question of attribution, not 
certainty: “Risk implies that the cause of possible damage is attributed to the system it-
self [and decisions made therein], whereas danger refers to the external attribution of a 
cause for possible damage.” (Japp and Kusche 2008: 88) Systems theory therefore at-
tributes risk to decision making.  
Beck’s risk society understands risk as “a material or symbolic … harm, or an alleged 
negative future event” (Zinn 2008b: 173) whereas systems theory defines risks more 
exclusively as inherent in any decision, socially constructed and then attributed – risk is 
understood as an “attribution of an undesired event to a decision” (ibid: 178). Different 
approaches to risk therefore show clearly that risk can be understood as a real harm, a 
symbolic harm, as a socially constructed and attributed harm. We will come back later 
to the implications of the attribution of risk. Whereas the governmentality approach is 
too limited in its understanding of risk as a statistical governance tool, the following 
analysis will employ concepts of both Beck’s risk society and the systems theory ap-
proach to shed light into the risk management of the Commission. 
Without attempting to assess the historical correctness of Beck’s distinction between 
traditional and modern risks, climate change fits very neatly with his description of a 
modern risk. Risk, according to Beck, is produced as a by-product of modernity (Beck 
1992: 19). Climate change is, at least partly, caused by greenhouse gases like carbon di-
oxide, which are by-products of industrial development. Climate change is thus – at 
least partly - created by the practices of “people, firms, state agencies and politicians” 
(Beck 1992: 98). Other than a natural hazard, a manufactured risk such as climate 
change is not geographically limited. Its border transcending character makes it an ines-
capable problem (Beck 1992: 21-3). The traditional insurance regimes are unable to 
cope with the scope and the unattributable causes of risks (Mythen 2004: 22-3) like cli-
mate change. This is a case of market failure: the markets produce risks, which are not 
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priced in the products they sell or in their production calculations. Yet, climate change 
has potentially catastrophic impacts which mankind has imposed on itself (Beck 1995: 
83). The Commission, as the legislative initiator of the EU, cannot escape this chal-
lenge. It has to find answers to an inescapable problem, which is magnified by a market 
failure to solve it. In this sense, the Commission does not control whether or not to 
face the risk of climate change. 
The definition of risks by an institution implies the establishment of acceptable levels 
of risks. These thresholds are legitimized by science. Here, and in relation to the risk lit-
erature mentioned, the first three institutional challenges become visible: 1) underesti-
mation or misrepresentation of risks, 2) unrepresentative estimation of risks or 3) nor-
matively contestable estimations of risk. 
Firstly, climate policy “can only be thought of in terms of scientific knowledge.” 
(Dreger 2008: 30). Like other modern risks, it is abstract on a time dimensions as it can 
occur with a severe time lag of several decades or generations (Beck 1999: 143). It is 
also abstract because CO2 is an imperceptible risk factor. Climate change has to be me-
diated and explained by science simply because it is abstractly and “indeterminately dis-
tanciated over space and time” (Bulkeley 2001: 432). In the explanation of risks, it be-
comes apparent, as established by Beck, that risks are both real and constructed. They 
exist as hazards, yet at the same time they are conceptualized in what Beck calls ‘rela-
tions of definitions’, that is by rules, institutions and other capacities with a structural 
impact (Beck 1999: 149). Concretely, climate change exists and its existence is concep-
tualized in an interaction of political institutions like the Commission with the scientific 
community and other actors of risk definition. Interestingly, science is losing its mo-
nopoly to define risks because the principles of modernity are directed against its own 
institutions as well (Beck 1992: 29). Beck calls this development ‘reflexive scientization’, 
that is, science is not trusted anymore to provide objective knowledge: “The application 
of scientific principles to itself discovers the implicit normativity, uncertainties, and lim-
its of knowledge production.” (Zinn 2008a: 22-23) Business and civil society actors 
contest expertise on climate change. The Commission’s attempts to provide for trans-
parency and openness even increase this phenomenon in the EU’s policy making. 
In such a context, science is only accepted as a legitimizing tool if it can prove the 
risk beyond doubt, even though “scientific methods more often yield probability than 
certainty.” (Caldwell 1996: 396) Hence, scientific actors might be tempted to present 
only conservative risk estimations, which they can prove beyond or with little doubt. 
The Commission would then base its risk assessment and the consequent policy on an 
estimation that underestimated the real risk. In another scenario, experts might feel the 
need to present only parts of the evidence to provide for a coherent picture. This, in 
turn, would lead to a misrepresentation of risk in the risk assessment of the Commis-
sion. The second case might also emerge as a result of a deliberate or unconscious se-
lection bias in the consulted experts. Also, in case a political goal is agreed upon, the 
tendency to “assume certainty where it does not exist may be expected” (ibid: 396), 
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both by the scientists and even more so by politicians. This is especially the case, be-
cause the European political and legal culture expects a degree of certainty in the for-
mulation of policies (ibid.) 
Secondly, the conceptualization of risk also differs depending on the background of 
the conceptualizing actor. Experts tend to balance costs and benefits, whereas lay peo-
ple are influenced more by the potential impacts than their probability: With regard to 
nuclear power, Chernobyl has shown that lay people would reject a cost-benefit analysis 
as such if the potential impacts were expected to be severe (Starr 1969). It therefore de-
pends on the groups consulted whether the Commission’s risk assessment resembles 
the risk assessment of the people its policy is supposed to represent. As the Commis-
sion tends to consult only experts, interest groups and officials from other institutions, 
a bias in the risk assessment is at least possible. 
Thirdly, the Commission’s risk management can be normatively contested. Beck has 
put forward the notion of ‘organized irresponsibility’, which is built on the assumption 
that institutions at the same time recognize a risk and attempt to reduce public concern 
(Beck 1995: 61), especially by establishing acceptable levels of risk. According to Beck, 
risks are “produced by industry, externalized by economics, individualized by the legal 
system, legitimized by the sciences and made to appear harmless by politics” (Beck 
1998: 16). This paper would not like to confuse risk management and risk communica-
tion – but Beck does point his finger to the interesting fact that institutions like the 
Commission need to work with acceptable risk levels to develop meaningful policies. 
By establishing thresholds of acceptable risks, the Commission makes normative deci-
sions. Risk management is not anymore a question of risk avoidance but of risk control. 
The normative questions of the acceptability of risk come to the forefront when it 
comes to the distribution of ‘bads’ instead of ‘goods’ (Beck 1992: 58). The Commission 
is caught in a highly political exercise of balancing political preferences regarding ac-
ceptable risk thresholds. Whatever threshold the Commission will chose it will always 
be subject to contestation by groups whose opinion it has disregarded or not consulted. 
Fourthly, an institutionally or functionally limited focus on the problem can emerge. 
Systems theory contributes in the same vein of the aforementioned institutional chal-
lenges derived from Beck’s risk society but it brings the nature of the decision-making 
system clearly to the fore. As every decision-making in systems theory is understood as 
contingent, risk is subject to the “self-referentiality of a functionally differentiated sys-
tem.” (Japp and Kusche: 81) Notions of validity, criteria of assessment, preferences or 
procedures in accordance with the functions of a system might lead to a bias in the risk 
assessment. Systems theory “interprets risk against the background of the functional 
differentiation of society. It sees risk conflicts as problems of the different logics of 
autonomous but structurally coupled systems” (Zinn 2008b: 203). The institutionalist 
logic assigns different interests to different institutions: whereas business analyses a risk 
through the lens of profit maximization, environmental NGOs look at a risk from the 
perspective of environmental protection. The Commission would then be expected to 
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analyse risk through the lens of its own institution, not necessarily through a broader, 
more encompassing lens. Path-dependent decisions to stick with earlier risk assess-
ments or other notions of risks such as a political risk could blur the risk assessment.  
Fifthly, systems theory informs us about a bias derived from risk transformation. Sys-
tems theory understands risks as unknown consequences in the future of decisions 
made today. Risk becomes the way of “observing time” because “[d]ecisions make the 
difference of time visible”. (Japp and Kusche 2008: 85)11 ‘Post decisional regret’ be-
comes inevitable because of the aforementioned contingency and nature of risk (ibid: 
86). This paper will elaborate on this aspect later in the next section. For now, it might 
be sufficient to say that the Commission, by devising policy on climate change, takes 
over risks: It decides although the decision might be wrong in the future, and it decides 
although knowledge about climate change is constantly evolving. Acting tough on cli-
mate change now is politically as risky as it is to act soft on climate change: in the un-
known future both pathways of action can turn out to be wrong. (Krücken 1997: 131) 
Thus, the economic and social risk climate change becomes a political risk for the insti-
tution as well. This form of risk transformation complicates matters for the Commis-
sion significantly. 
To summarize, five institutional biases to risk assessment and management could 
emerge within the Commission: 1) a misrepresentation or underestimation of risk, 2) an 
unrepresentative estimation of risks, 3) normatively contestable estimations of risk, 4) 
an institutionally or functionally limited view on risk, 5) a blurred focus on the political 
aspect of the risk due to risk transformation. In the following section, a sixth institu-
tional bias following from time aspects is introduced separately.  
2.2. The sixth parallax fallacy of time-lag 
A recent special edition of the Journal of European Public Policy has argued for ac-
counting better for the influence of time in European politics. Time, it is put forward, is 
an “institutional property” (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 181) which structures the 
outcome of politics. Sequence, duration, cycles, temporal consistency are but a few fea-
tures of time, which make it a political resource. The inherent parallax fallacy related to 
the institutional time of the EU shall be exemplified by shortly introducing the deci-
sion-making process with a special view on its time dimension. 
Time represents resources for the Commission which allow it to serve as an agenda-
setter, building block and as a broker. (Tholoniat 2009: 222-4). On the basis of the 
                                                           
11
 The governmentality approach would even say that to “calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline 
the future.” (Ewald 1991: 207) 
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Commission’s White Paper on Administrative Reform 2000, the White Paper on Euro-
pean Governance 2001 and the better law-making initiative 2002, the Commission has 
developed its mechanisms of time management: Strategic Planning and Programming 
cycle (SPP), Commission’s Legislative and Work Programme (CLWP) and the Annual 
Policy Strategy (APS). In most policy fields, the Commission publishes so-called Action 
Plans, which often span time periods of seven to ten years. The SPP makes sure that 
legislative initiatives are announced on average 12-24 months before their adoption, to 
give time for external participation before they are included in the annual policy cycle 
for the forthcoming year (Tholoniat 2009: 228-30).  
Normally, the Commission prepares the ground for a legislative proposal with several 
preparatory papers, which it publishes to collect external input along the process. A 
Green Paper sets out the policy options, often on the basis of commissioned impact as-
sessments. After having started a consultation process on the Green Paper, the Com-
mission will circulate a first draft of the Directive within the institution. So-called “non-
papers” might also leave the institution more or less informally during this stage. At the 
end of the interservice negotiations within the Commission, the legislative proposal for 
a directive is published and passed on to the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament. The Commission also publishes impact assessments alongside their legisla-
tive proposals. They provide insights into the economic, social and environmental im-
pacts of the potential directive and facilitate policy choices within the Commission ser-
vices. Their preparation takes between 6-12 months (Tholoniat 2009: 231). The entire 
process of preparing a legislative proposal therefore takes mostly at least two years, in 
many instances longer. 
After the publication of the proposal, the institutional bargaining between Council, 
Parliament and Commission begins. The decisional cycle is influenced by the electoral 
cycle and the political time budget, which it attributes to the decision-makers (Goetz 
and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 185). Time can also be manipulated, and there are various fac-
tors, which influence how, for instance, the Commission times the publication of the 
proposal (Kovats 2009); or when the decision-making dynamics are speeded up or de-
layed (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009; Héritier and Farrell 2004, Héritier 2007 on early 
decision making). The normal adoption process varies according to the degree of con-
sensus. Between May 1999 and December 2006, 564 files have been concluded with the 
codecision procedure. 38.5% of the files were 1st reading agreements, which on average 
took 13.7 months. 44.1% of the directives were 2nd reading agreements, which took on 
average 26.5 months to conclude. 17.4% of the files were only agreed upon in concilia-
tion, which took on average 33.7 months (http://ec.europa.eu/ codeci-
sion/institutional/analysis/codecision_ stat_en.pdf, April 2009). The current trend 
seems to move towards more 1st reading agreements but an increase in time of the ne-
gotiations (ibid.). The official decision-making procedure therefore takes between a 
good year and nearly three years, with more than a half of the debates taking longer 
than on average 2 years.  
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In addition, the adaptation of a proposal does not equal its implementation: 
 “The key issue along the policy dimension is then: when, in what sequence, how 
quickly and for how long are benefits to be provided and costs to be imposed? 
When should a new directive come into force? In what sequence should EU 
measures for combating climate change be implemented and what is the appropriate 
time scale for action? How quickly should transitional arrangements be phased out? 
How long should a temporary derogation last? Time rules are thus applied as tools 
of governance.” (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 189-90) 
It is for this reason that Wettestad (2005) has pointed out how a quick adoption im-
pacted the quality and the decision-making dynamics of the first Emissions Trading 
Scheme directive in 2003. In his eyes, the adoption (and implementation) within 2 years 
could be termed as an “ultra-quick political pregnancy” (Wettestad 2005).12  
Due to business cycles and other deliberations, temporary derogations and transi-
tional arrangements can easily span an additional decade. Also, after the legislation has 
come into force completely, compliance still needs to be ensured. 
Although Goetz and Meyer-Sahling claim that EU policy is more time consistent and 
better at distributing costs over time than national policy (2009: 191), the policy which 
is eventually in place can suffer from a time-lag of 2-16 years: a Commission internal 
time-lag of 1-3 years, a decision-making time-lag of 1-3 years and an implementation 
time-lag of up to 10 years. This institutional bias is particularly worrying in a field such 
as climate change, which experiences scientific updates regularly. Policies on the basis 
of consensual data from year x might be considered sufficient in the particular years of 
policy preparation but might be clearly insufficient by year x+n when the policy is 
adopted or implemented. 
3. The Commission’s risk management mechanisms 
Before turning to the 2° Celsius target, the Commission’s risk management mecha-
nisms shall be shortly introduced and set into perspective with a view to the identified 
institutional biases. The Commission has publicly noted that it sees a need to account 
for the fact that “society has become less tolerant towards risks” (Commission 2000b: 
11). Insofar, it does recognise some of the potential pitfalls mentioned above. It was in 
particular responsive to the potential political contestation of its policies and the possi-
bility of misunderstanding a certain risk. It has developed a three-step risk strategy, 
consisting of risk assessment, risk management and risk communication (Commission 
                                                           
12 He in particular argues that one policy proposal in itself is often preceded by failed proposals before, which 
should be taken into the calculus (ibid.). 
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2000a: 8). Risk assessment consists of hazard identification, hazard characterisation, 
appraisal of exposure, and risk characterisation (ibid: 14). Risk assessment, according to 
the Commission, does not need to restrict itself to only quantifiable data but can also 
be informed by qualitative scientific data (ibid: 12).  
In establishing the risk assessment, the Commission’s objective is to build on “so-
cially robust” knowledge - knowledge, which was subject to an “extended peer-review” 
not only from the scientific community but also from stakeholders, civil society and 
those possessing local or practical knowledge. (Commission 2001a: ii) This approach 
emanates from the acknowledgement that expertise is increasingly contested and politi-
cised. From this fact, the Commission drew the conclusion that expertise needs to be 
democratised, i.e. to extend the “traditional procedures for assessing quality” without 
sacrificing its quality (ibid: 7). Insofar, the Commission explicitly tackles that its risk 
analysis may be victim to the parallax fallacy of not being representative. At the same 
time, it runs a risk of accepting a trade-off between increased participation and de-
creased quality of the result. 
Whereas the Commission has been very careful to develop guidelines, which ensure 
the independence of advice (or a clear attribution of advice to interests), as well as 
transparency and openness of the process (Commission 2003), such an undertaking 
creates an institutional overload. The Commission organises expert hearings and con-
sultations and has committed itself to a transparent governance process because the 
quality of “EU policy depends on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy 
chain – from conception to implementation” (Commission 2001b). Due to the strained 
administrative capacity of the Commission, there is an overload of information and 
administrative obligations in organising this information. A structural bias reinforcing 
the parallax fallacy of underestimating risks could easily emerge; which disables the 
Commission to realise that incoming information by stakeholders, lay experts and civil 
society blurs the message of scientists, which warn of potential consequences of a prob-
lem. 
Because risks can be underestimated, the EU’s environmental policy is committed to 
the precautionary principle and the principle of preventive action (Art. 174 2, Treaty 
Establishing the European Community). The same principle is enshrined in interna-
tional treaties on the environment, for instance in the United Nations’ Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Art. 3.3). In its communication on the precautionary 
principle, the Commission sets out the principles of precautionary measures and its ap-
plication guidelines. The Commission understands the precautionary principle as a 
mechanism of risk management with inherent political responsibilities, which should be 
applied when “potentially dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or 
process have been identified” whereas “scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to 
be determined with sufficient certainty.” (Commission 2000a: 3-4) Precautionary meas-
ures should be proportional, non-discriminatory, consistent, based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, subject to review and based on comprehensive risk assessments. (ibid: 4) The 
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Commission is very clear in defining the “appropriate response in a given situation [… 
as] the result of an political [sic!] decision, a function of the risk level that is “accept-
able” to the society on which the risk is imposed.” (ibid: 16) This function of accept-
able risk should be established on the basis of the “latest knowledge” (Commission 
2000b: 12). The Commission is, however, dependent on the political decision of actu-
ally evoking the precautionary principle. Additionally, the inclusion of constantly to be 
updated ‘latest knowledge’ slows down the internal decision-making. This efficiency 
problem is solved with a hesitancy to include new knowledge the longer the proposal 
has been debated within the institution. In that sense, the attempt to solve the parallax 
fallacy of underestimating risks via the precautionary principle has led to an increased 
danger of producing normatively contestable risks estimations. 
The evaluation of risk management options consequently includes considerations of 
cost-benefit analysis, social perception and acceptance of risks, and the administrative 
feasibility of the options (ibid: 24). Such evaluation criteria are obviously subject to po-
litical considerations. The cost-benefit analysis in the Commission is made on the basis 
of impact assessments, at the latest since 2003. Impact assessment, as understood by 
the Commission is the “process of systematic analysis of the likely [economic, social 
and environmental] impacts of intervention by public authorities” (Commission 2002: 
3) and should inform decision making, but not substitute political judgement (ibid.). 
Impact assessments are preceded by a preselective assessment of options and factors to 
assess, and concluded before the proposal for a directive enters the inter-service consul-
tations (ibid). Impact assessments normally offer arguments for a preferred policy op-
tion and explain alternative options and their implications. The Commission has a pref-
erence for quantified impact analysis but acknowledges that cost-benefit analysis may 
not always provide all relevant information – impact assessments thus should take into 
account the precautionary principle, questions of irreversibility, different time horizons 
and distributive effects (ibid: 16) Impact assessments, in this sense, contribute to reduc-
ing the normative contestability and the institutionally limited view on risk. 
To conclude this section, the Commission has various mechanisms in place which 
should ensure that its risk assessment is both representative of the facts and of public 
opinion: expert consultation, stakeholder consultation, impact assessments and internal 
procedures to ensure the correct usage of the mechanisms of risk assessment. The 
Commission does suffer, however, from an institutional overload at times. Risk assess-
ment has been turned into a more political exercise by the Commission, which might 
quickly impact the accuracy of the assessment. It seems that the parallax fallacies related 
to factual misrepresentation of risk have been extensively tackled, but the fallacies re-
lated to political aspects have only seen improvements on the participatory dimension; 
without necessarily solving the risk transformation and the normative contestability 
problem. The time dimension has not been institutionally accounted for, despite rheto-
rics on the necessity to always include the most recent knowledge. 
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4. The 2° Celsius target as an illustration of the 
parallax fallacies 
In the following, it shall be assessed whether the safeguards and mechanisms of the 
Commission to ensure a good risk management are sufficient despite the identified po-
tential biases. As a point in case, the 2° Celsius target in climate policy has been chosen 
because it represents the foundation of the EU’s climate policy in the last decade. 
The 2° Celsius target was first agreed upon by the Council of Ministers in 1996: “the 
Council believes that global average temperatures should not exceed 2 degrees above 
pre-industrial level and that therefore concentration levels lower than 550 ppm [parts 
per million] CO2 should guide global limitations and reduction efforts” (Council 1996). 
The target was based on the 2nd Assessment Report of the IPCC. Although this target 
was set by the Council, the Commission fully subscribes to it and implements it in its 
proposals for directives. Insofar, it seems legitimate to take this target as a test case.  
What the time management mechanisms of the Commission – or not to mention 
other institutions like the Council - do not account for, are structural time-lags, which it 
inherits from external inputs. A particularly striking example is the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which provided the scientific base for the 2° Celsius 
target. The IPCC provides policy-makers with the scientific knowledge about climate 
change. It has a rigorous review process in place, which ensures scientific precision. 
This process takes several years before a new report is released. The work on the 2007 
report, for instance, was started as early as in 2002/03 (NZZ 2007). The IPCC only 
considers peer-reviewed scientific publications in its review, which imply another time-
lag: Scientific research works with data it first has to collect and assess. Research find-
ings which are submitted to academic peer-review can easily be one to two years old, 
the review process takes possibly another year, and consecutively, the review process in 
the IPCC can take up to 4-5 years. All in all, the IPCC reports work with research find-
ings, which can be 2-8 years old and thereby produce a time-lag external to the Com-
mission’s policy development timeframe. 
As mentioned above, climate policy developed by the Commission can suffer from 
an internal time-lag of 1-3 years, a decision-making time-lag of 1-3 years and an imple-
mentation time-lag of up to 10 years. On top of it, a scientific time-lag of 2-8 years has 
to be accounted for in the case of climate policy – and the fact that the decision for the 
2° Celsius target is already older than a decade. The 2° Celsius target is therefore poten-
tially outdated by more than two decades.  
As a consequence, one leading IPCC scientist (personal conversation 2008) estimates 
that new scientific findings which are not yet accounted for in the latest IPCC report 
(2007) indicate that the 2° Celsius target of EU climate policy will produce results 
which are closer to those results which have been expected for a rise in temperature of 
3-4° Celsius. Rather, he claims, the EU would need to strive for a rise in temperature of 
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1-1.5° Celsius. This is a bias that has emerged from the accumulated time-lags men-
tioned above.  
It should be additionally noted, that external structural time-lags are subject to further 
dynamics. The European Environmental Agency (EEA), for instance, has noted that 
many phenomena can have “such long latent periods between first exposures and late 
effects that ‘pipelines’ of unstoppable consequences, decades long, were set in place be-
fore actions could have been taken to stop further exposures.” (EEA 2003: 3) The 
EEA notes that the time lag between the identification of a problem and regulatory ac-
tion taken against it can be as long as even a century (ibid : 168). Often, this happened 
either because early warnings were not taken seriously or knowledge was yet missing 
(ibid.). Often, risk assessments conducted do not account for the possibility that impor-
tant factors were outside the scope of the assessment (ibid : 169). Krücken shows that 
climate change belongs to those instances where early warning was available centuries 
ago: In 1827, Jean de Fourier explained the greenhouse gas effect as well as the impact 
of CO2 for the first time. In 1896, Svante Arrhenius claimed that the greenhouse gas ef-
fect is linked to human usage of fossil energy. He also predicted that a doubling of CO2 
emissions would lead to an increase in temperature by 6° Celsius. Hermann Flohn pub-
lished in 1941 that anthropogenic factors influence the climate. Only from the 1970s 
onwards, however, was it possible to distinguish the different factors influencing cli-
mate from another. (Krücken 1997: 137-43) Already in 1987, the German Metereologi-
cal Society and the German Society of Physicians warned 2500 journalists, politicians 
and scientists in 1987, emphasising that the emerging climate change induced by man-
kind would constitute – “apart from a war with nuclear weapons – one of the biggest 
threats for mankind” (cited in Krücken 1997: 165). The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change was founded in 1988 and was only able to provide convincing argu-
ments for regulatory action in the early 1990s. 
The time bias is therefore valid in the case of the 2° Celsius target. Closely linked to 
this parallax fallacy is the bias on the misrepresentation or underestimation of risk. Dur-
ing the finalisation of the last legislative package on climate change in December 2008, 
voices from the European Parliament, NGOs and science emphasised that the 2° Cel-
sius target misrepresents and underestimates the risk (for instance: Tällberg Foundation 
2008). Schnellnhuber, an IPCC scientist and advisor to the German government, sum-
marizes the criticism as follow: there are more CO2 emissions than expected, and feed-
back effects such as formerly unknown dynamics in the ozeans, ice-shelfs and the 
woods point at a more speedy development than thought before. (ZEIT 2009). Instead 
of adapting the target to the latest available knowledge, the Commission preferred for 
political reasons to push the admittedly insufficient yet political possible legislation 
through (personal conversation with Commission official 2008). It becomes evident 
that the institutional bias of an underestimation of the risk can be linked to the parallax 
fallacy of institutional arguing and the focus on the political aspect of the risk. 
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The 2° Celsius target put in place in 1996 was repeatedly confirmed during the course 
of the regulatory action taken consequently. However, acknowledgements were made 
with time that “2°C would already imply significant impacts on ecosystems” (Council 
2004). A certain degree of negative impacts is accepted as tolerable. The European 
Commission refers to the target in various documents, for instance in its Communica-
tion “Winning the Battle Against Climate Change (Commission 2005). The Commis-
sion translated the degree target into concrete emission targets of CO2 emission in parts 
per million (ppm) of under 550 ppm.  
The Communication argues on the basis of scientific evidence that the costs of 
abatement are lower than the costs of the consequences of climate change if the 2° Cel-
sius target is achieved. This argumentation clearly is a cost-benefit analysis of risks – it 
does not aim at reducing the risks as much as possible but it aims at reducing the risks 
to a cost-efficient minimum. The 2° Celsius target accepts certain consequences and 
would like to avoid other more extreme, less controllable ones. 
The Commission has been very transparent in setting out the risks a 2° Celsius target 
would like to avoid and is willing to take (Commission 2005). It is obvious, that the 2° 
Celsius target was subject to impact assessments and expert consultations. The docu-
ment recognises that an increase of average temperature of 2.5° Celsius could lead to 
“50 million additional people at risk of hunger” (ibid.). Such a risk calculus implicitly 
implies that a lower number of additional people experiencing food scarcity as toler-
able. A 1 to 2° Celsius increase of average temperature will result in up to 15 to 20% of 
ecosystem areas worldwide to shift and a severe loss of biodiversity is expected. 
Whereas this risk is accepted with a 2° Celsius target, the consequences of higher tem-
peratures are considered to be intolerable: global losses of up to 10% of coastal wet-
lands, large losses of species and biosystems (ibid.). With an increase of 2 to 2.5° Cel-
sius compared to pre-industrial levels, additional 2.4 to 3.1 billion people will suffer 
from water stress induced by scarcity of water resources, water supply and quality 
(ibid.). A risk calculus which aims at less than 2° Celsius increase therefore still accepts 
additional people to be under increased water stress. An increase of 1.4° Celsius will in-
crease the risk of coastal floods so that an additional 10 million people are at risk. 
Whereas this risk is accepted, a risk for 80 million people as expected for a rise of 3.2° 
Celsius is considered to be too high (ibid.). The Communication acknowledges that 
some “climate feedbacks that strongly accelerate climate change by exceeding specific 
temperature thresholds” which may lead to “irreversible changes to the climate system, 
or result in sudden and rapid exacerbation of certain impacts requiring unachievable 
rates of adaptation” (ibid.) might be accepted by the 2° Celsius target.  
The presumably controllable probability attached to the potential changes might in 
the eyes of many not be outweighed by the potential impacts of climate change. Inso-
far, the Commission follows a risk management strategy that might be attributed to the 
second claim of a misrepresentation of risk. It becomes evident that the 2° Celsius tar-
get is a risk management strategy, not so much a risk avoidance strategy. The target 
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knowingly accepts a high level of risk for some regional areas and tolerates significant 
changes of the global biosystems. This confirms the assumption made above that the 
Commission makes normatively contestable risk estimations and proposed a risk man-
agement strategy which is not value-free but rather based at least partly on political de-
cisions.  
Conclusion 
This paper has outlined different institutional biases of the Commission in its time, 
risk and knowledge management: Six institutional biases to risk assessment and man-
agement can and do emerge within the Commission: 1) a misrepresentation or underes-
timation of risk, 2) an unrepresentative estimation of risks, 3) normatively contestable 
estimations of risk, 4) an institutionally or functionally limited view on risk, 5) a blurred 
focus on the political aspect of the risk due to risk transformation, and 6) a time-lag in 
the risk calculations.  
It is evident that some of the institutional biases cannot be solved. Possibly, they 
should not be solved. It can be positive that risks are politicised and decided upon in a 
deliberation. A political process will leave winners and losers behind which in general 
can be compensated with the same or another decision. It can also be positive that an 
institution follows its fragmented logic. This paper did not attempt to make a normative 
judgement whether the institutional biases, which are linked to political deliberations, 
are good or bad. The paper only attempted to show that in the distribution of ‘bads’ by 
the Commission, that is of risks, institutional parallax fallacies exist.  
This paper was not able nor did it aim at establishing reliable cause-effect relation-
ships. It attempted to provide an illustration of some potential pitfalls in EU policy 
making. As this edition is intended to primarily inform young researchers, this paper 
hopes to be able to encourage more ‘young’ research in the black box Commission, the 
EU’s legislative initiator. The paper has pointed at six parallax fallacies, which can serve 
as a starting point for validation research and further thinking. Nota bene, it might well 
be that further research is able to point additional parallax fallacies, linked to, for exam-
ple, the policy-making process. One instance could be the impact of internal decision-
informing procedures of the Commission, where scientific insights into risks are in-
creasingly summarized and reduced in complexity for the rushed elite at the higher lev-
els of hierarchy. 
The author would like to thank two anonymous interviewees (a high-ranking Com-
mission official and an IPCC lead author) with whom he was in contact in December 
2008. 
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